Abstract. This paper is devoted to the design and analysis of short undeniable signatures based on a random oracle. Exploiting their online property, we can achieve signatures with a fully scalable size depending on the security level. To this end, we develop a general framework based on the interpolation of group homomorphisms, leading to the design of a generic undeniable signature scheme called MOVA with batch verification and featuring nontransferability. By selecting group homomorphisms with a small group range, we obtain very short signatures. We also minimize the number of moves of the verification protocols by proposing some variants with only two moves in the random oracle model. We provide a formal security analysis of MOVA and assess the security in terms of the signature length. Under reasonable assumptions and with some carefully selected parameters, the MOVA scheme makes it possible to consider signatures of about 50 bits.
Introduction
An undeniable signature scheme is similar to a classical digital signature except that the recipient of a message cannot verify its validity alone: he needs to interact with the signer in order to be convinced of the validity or invalidity of the signature. This property, called invisibility, opposes to the universal verifiability of classical digital signatures and allows the signer to have a control on how his signature spreads. This concept was put forth by Chaum and van Antwerpen [17] in 1989 and was mainly motivated by the need for privacy of a signer dealing with private or sensitive contract. Later on, several additional applications have been proposed such as licensing sensitive software [15] , electronic voting [52] , and digital cash [10, 16, 50] . An undeniable signature scheme is composed of a key generation algorithm, a signature generation algorithm, a confirmation protocol to prove the validity of a valid signature, and a denial protocol to prove the invalidity of an invalid signature. It achieves nonrepudiation in the sense that valid signatures can only be forged by the signer and cannot be denied, but invalid signatures can be denied. Privacy is based on invisibility. It can be strengthened further by having proofs nontransferable: a malicious verifier cannot take advantage of the interaction with the prover to prove (in)validity of a signature to a third party.
Following the seminal article of Chaum and van Antwerpen, a quite fair amount of work has been dedicated to this field. In particular, their original scheme gave rise to a series of articles [9, 15, 18, 20, 33, 38, 39, 45, 46] devoted to schemes based on the discrete logarithm problem. As alternative of the discrete logarithm, Gennaro et al. [24] proposed an undeniable signature based on RSA and Biehl et al. [6] devised a scheme based on quadratic orders. The tremendous development of pairing-based cryptography over the last few years also influenced the field of undeniable signatures as illustrated by the identity-based scheme of Libert and Quisquater [36] and schemes proposed by Laguillaumie and Vergnaud [34, 35] . Besides, it is worth to mention papers dealing with other issues such as the transferability of the (in)validity proof of a signature [21] or blackmailing against the signer [29] .
In traditional digital signature schemes, the security collapses when the signature is too short because of universal verifiability: an attacker can try to guess a signature until it is valid in order to forge it. One advantage of undeniable signatures is that the security smoothly decreases with the signature length. As an example, we can think of 20-bit signatures which cannot be forged but with a probability of success of 2 −20 . The forger can increase it in an on-line attack, but the number of verification or signing queries can be easily limited. So, undeniable signatures could in principle be arbitrarily small, e.g., as small as a MAC, although no such signatures were proposed prior to this work.
Our Contribution As far as we know, all previous signature schemes did not fully exploit the lack of offline verification capability towards the design of schemes offering very short signatures. One of the main contributions of this work is to remedy to this situation. To this goal, we develop a general framework based on the sole notion of the interpolation of group homomorphisms. Based on it, we define a decisional problem and a computational problem, which generalizes several fundamental problems related to public-key cryptography. Among them, we find the decision and computational DiffieHellman problems as well as the quadratic residuosity problem. We use this settings to develop a new scheme called MOVA which is based on a group homomorphism privately known by the signer.
The interest of this technique to undeniable signatures is twofold. First, group homomorphisms allow one to express the well-known Chaum's undeniable signature [15] and the RSA undeniable signature of Gennaro et al. [24] in a unified formalism. Secondly, we obtain very short signatures in a quite natural way, namely by instantiating our MOVA scheme with group homomorphisms with a range group of small size. In addition to this, we introduce nontransferability features in our MOVA scheme.
We also propose some two-move verification protocols for MOVA in the random oracle model. As far as we know, these are the first interactive verification protocols achieving only two moves. We provide some formal security proofs on the different required properties related to the confirmation and denial protocols such as the soundness, zeroknowledge, and nontransferability. We address invisibility and unforgeability in settings where the attacker has access to signing, confirmation, and denial oracles. This provides precise security bounds and explain how to select MOVA parameters.
Finally, we offer a batch verification protocol.
Structure of the Paper
The next section gives the definition of cryptographic primitives, and the subsequent one is devoted to the security model of undeniable signatures. In Sect. 4, we develop the concept of interpolation of group homomorphisms and provide some technical results that are necessary for the rest of this article. It includes interactive protocols that are used in some setup and verification protocols of MOVA. Then, we give a description of our new scheme called MOVA and prove its security in Sect. 5. Finally, we provide some possible instantiations and parameters, discuss additional properties of MOVA, and conclude this paper.
Preliminaries
Notation A function f (n) is called polynomial and we write f (n) = poly(n) if there exists an integer k such that f (n) = O(n k ). It is called negligible and we write f (n) = negl(n) if for any integer k, we have f (n) = O(n −k ). For a set S, the notation s ∈ U S means that we assign to s an element picked uniformly at random in S. For a probabilistic algorithm A, we denote by A(x; r) the output produced by A on input x with coins r and by y ← A(x) the action of assigning y to the output of A with input x and random coins as we often omit the coins from the notation when unnecessary. The statistical distance between two random variables X 1 and X 2 with range X is (X 1 , X 2 ) = 1 2 x∈X | Pr[X 1 = x] − Pr[X 2 = x]|. Two random variables X and Y are computationally resp. statistically resp. perfectly indistinguishable and we write X ≈ c Y resp. X ≈ s Y resp. X ≈ p Y if no polynomially bounded distinguisher can tell X and Y apart with nonnegligible advantage resp. (X, Y ) is negligible resp. X and Y have the same probability distribution.
When dealing with Abelian groups, we will use additive notation for group operations.
Proof of Membership A proof protocol Proto is a pair Proto = (P, V) of interactive algorithms called a prover and a verifier. The verifier V is assumed to be probabilistic with polynomial-time complexity. The prover P is unbounded. One of the two algorithms is called the initiator in the protocol.
We recall that an interactive machine is defined by a deterministic algorithm A mapping an input x, some coins r, and a list (possibly empty in the case of the initiator) of input messages m 1 , . . . , m n to a next-message A(x, m 1 , . . . , m n ; r) = m . A message ending by a special termination symbol is called a final message. The (x, r, m 1 , . . . , m n ) tuple is called the partial view of the machine. It is complete if either m n or A(x, m 1 , . . . , m n ; r) is a final message.
An instance of a protocol execution denoted P(w; r P ) x ↔ V(z; r V ) refers to using x as a common input, w as a private input for P (this may be called a witness), z as a private input for V (this may be called an auxiliary input), and r P resp. r V as random coins for P resp. V. 1 The output from V, denoted Output V (P(w; r P ) x ↔ V(z; r V )), is the last message from V.
In the random oracle model, algorithms may access to an oracle Gen which implements a random function with uniform distribution mapping elements of a specified domain to elements of a specified range. For simplicity, we restrict to cases where the domain and the range are finite sets. Note that an empty domain corresponds to the standard model where random oracles are not used.
A proof of membership for language L is defined by a set K of pairs
, a mapping L(x) defining the set of witnesses for a given x ∈ L, and a proof protocol (P Gen , V Gen ). The proof must verify the following properties. ε-Soundness. For any x ∈ L, any algorithm P * , any (K V p , K V s ) ∈ K, given a random r V and a random instance Gen, we have
Completeness. For any x ∈ L, w ∈ L(x), (K
The definition was adapted here to accommodate cases where the verifier has a public/private key pair. The classical definition with auxiliary input is when K V p is void. Later, the secret of the verifier may allow a malicious prover to cheat. For this, we need to replace the notion of proof by the notion of argument where soundness is replaced by the following property.
ε-Computational Soundness. For any x ∈ L, any polynomial algorithm P * , given some random (K V p , K V s ) ∈ K, r V , and Gen, we have
1 Since P is unbounded, we could assume that the prover uses neither witness nor any random coin without loss of generality. In practice, however, we use a probabilistic polynomially bounded prover with a witness set up as some kind of secret key. So we keep it in the notation to avoid confusion That is, the malicious prover is now given some limited time to cheat online given the key of the verifier but still has any time to cheat offline given the instance x.
The proof/argument of membership is zero-knowledge (ZK) if the following property is satisfied.
Zero-Knowledge.
There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine B such that for any x ∈ L, any w ∈ L(x), and any polynomial-time verifier V * , any auxiliary input z, and any K V p , given a random r P , r V , r B , and Gen, we have
where B V * ,Gen (x, K V p , z; r B ) denotes the output of B with oracle V * and Gen, input x, K V p , z, and random coins r B . Depending on the type of indistinguishability, we have computational resp. statistical resp. perfect ZK. We further say that the proof is straight-line ZK if we can construct an online fake prover P * with input z who cheats by looking at the communication tape between V * and Gen, i.e., if B consists of simulating the interaction
We note that the above definition of zero-knowledge is black-box [26] , which means that we require the existence of one "universal" simulator having an oracle access to the verifier.
In the standard model, Barak et al. [4] proved that zero-knowledge proofs of an NPcomplete language (possibly non-black-box) requires at least three moves. To overcome this limitation, the notion of zero-knowledge was extended in the random oracle model (for more details, see [5] ) in which the queries to the random oracles are controlled by the simulator, i.e., it can simulate the output of the oracles, provided that the output distribution is correct. Pass [49] proposed the notion of deniable zero-knowledge in which the simulator is no longer allowed to simulate the output of the random oracles, but is only able to observe the queries made to the random oracles and the corresponding answers. This restriction makes the simulator to produce views that do not yield evidence that the interactive proof occurred. The above definition follows this model. Pass [49] showed that two moves are necessary and sufficient to achieve deniable zero-knowledge for NP. Our interactive zero-knowledge proofs (with two moves) involving random oracles will be deniable. Deniability is indeed crucial to preserve invisibility in undeniable signatures. 2 The argument of membership is nontransferable (NT) if the following property is satisfied.
Nontransferability. There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm P * such that for any x ∈ L, any (K V p , K V s ) ∈ K, any verifier V * , given a random r P , r V , and
Gen, we have
Depending on the type of indistinguishability we have computational resp. statistical resp. perfect NT.
Clearly, the value K V s allows a malicious prover to cheat with a verifier with public key K V p in polynomial time. Thus, we cannot achieve regular soundness. We note that the definition of nontransferability allows one to avoid some attacks in which the verifier V * identified with K V p interact with the honest signer and a hidden malicious verifierṼ so thatṼ gets a proof that x ∈ L. Namely, our definition ensures that V * with knowledge of K V s could simulate the messages sent by S (without any help from S) in a straight-line way. Indeed, if we restrict to malicious verifiers knowing K V s , the protocol is straight-line ZK in a standard-model sense since P * does not cheat by looking at the interaction tape between V * and the random oracle.
Our definition of nontransferability is similar to the one of Camenisch and Michels [14] with the main difference that our version assumes that V * is computationally unbounded. We can thus assume without loss of generality that V * makes no queries to the signing and confirmation/denial oracles when considering undeniable signatures. Therefore, the nontransferability of the protocols presented below will also hold with respect to the Camenisch-Michels definition.
The proof of membership is noninteractive zero-knowledge (NIZK) if the prover is the initiator and sends a single message and if the protocol satisfies the following property.
Noninteractive Zero-Knowledge. There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine B such that for any x ∈ L, any w ∈ L(x), and any K V p , given a random r P , r B , and Gen, we have
where
generates an algorithm defining a function which simulates Gen.
Trapdoor Commitment Scheme We use trapdoor commitment schemes [11] . These were used by Jakobsson et al. [30] to construct nontransferable proofs. We will follow their methodology as well. [12] .
Trapdoor One-Way Permutations over a set S of bitstrings of a given fixed length (depending on the security parameter) are made of three algorithms. The first one generates a pair of keys (K p , K s ). The other two are deterministic and map x ∈ S to TPOW(K p , x) resp. TPOW −1 (K s , x), both in S. They must be such that TPOW −1 (K s , TPOW(K p , x)) = x for any x. Here again, TPOW −1 is a life jacket algorithm which is not meant to ever be used in our constructions. We denote Succ inv-tp A the probability for an adversary A to compute TPOW −1 (K s , y) given a random (uniform) y ∈ S, without knowing K s .
Undeniable Signature
We consider two players who are the signer S and the verifier V. Let k ∈ N be a security parameter, M the message space, and Σ the signature space. 3 An undeniable signature scheme is composed of the four following algorithms.
Setup
The setup is composed of two probabilistic polynomial-time (in terms of k) algorithms Setup S and Setup V producing the signer's key pair Following [32] , undeniable signatures come with the following security properties: unforgeability and invisibility, in addition to the ZK properties of Confirm and Deny. Unforgeability ensures nonrepudiation, so that we can call the scheme a signature scheme. Nonrepudiation is formalized by resisting adaptive existential forgery attacks. Invisibility with respect to an active attacker who tries to distinguish a valid messagesignature pair from a randomly picked one is considered. It thus protects privacy. ZK argument of membership assumes computational soundness of the proof and zeroknowledge. In addition to this, we will consider nontransferability. This last property ensures that a malicious verifier is not able to convince any third party of the validity of the statement (e.g., a given message signature is valid) proven in the protocol. The nontransferability notion may be important in some applications where the validity of the argument itself is valuable (like for licensing software).
We consider the standard security notion of existential forgery under an adaptive chosen-message attack as defined by Goldwasser et al. [28] for classical digital signatures. This notion is similar to Kurosawa-Heng [33] and is adapted as follows.
Existential
Unforgeability. An undeniable signature scheme is secure against an existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attack if there exists no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm F which wins the following game with a nonnegligible probability.
Game: F receives a public key
Then, F can query some chosen messages to a signing oracle, some chosen pairs (m, σ ) ∈ M × Σ to a confirmation (and denial) protocol oracle, and interact with it in a confirmation (denial) protocol where the oracle plays the role of the signer. All these queries must be polynomially bounded in k and can be sent adaptively. F wins the game if it outputs a valid pair (m * , σ * ) ∈ M × Σ such that m * was not queried to the signing oracle.
The success probability of F in this game is denoted by Succ
We use a similar definition as Kurosawa-Heng [33] .
Invisibility. Consider first a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D called invisibility distinguisher and the two following games with respect to a bit b.
, it can query some chosen messages to a signing oracle and some chosen message-signature pairs (m, σ ) ∈ M × Σ to an oracle telling whether (m, σ ) is valid or not. At some point, D chooses one message m * ∈ M which was not queried to the signing oracle and submits it to the challenger. If b = 0, he sets σ * = Sign(K S s , m * ). Otherwise, σ * is picked uniformly at random in Σ . D receives σ * . After that, the distinguisher can query the signing, confirmation, and denial oracles again, provided that m * is not a query of the signing oracle and (m * , σ * ) is not a query of the confirmation or denial protocols. Finally, D outputs a guess bit b .
We define the advantage of the distinguisher as follows:
where probabilities are over the random tapes of the involved algorithms. An undeniable signature scheme is said to be invisible under a chosen-message attack if there exists no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D with a nonnegligible advantage.
Note that this definition is similar to that of Galbraith et al. [23] except that the distinguisher is not allowed to query m * to the signing oracle in our definition. The invisibility notion of Galbraith et al. cannot be satisfied when the signature is deterministic (which is the case for MOVA). This will be discussed in Remark 5.3.
Interpolation of Group Homomorphisms

Problem Definitions
We define several generic problems related to some arbitrary Abelian groups. Later, these groups will be generated by a specific setup algorithm, and some attached trapdoor will render some of the problems easy.
The concept of group homomorphism interpolation is defined below. 
Group Homomorphism Interpolation Problem
We state here the Group Homomorphism Interpolation problem (GHI problem) and its corresponding decisional problem (GHID problem). All problems assume parameters defining two Abelian groups G and H , a set S ⊆ G × H of cardinality s, and a positive integer n. We define the language L GHI (n, S) ⊆ (G×H ) n of all tuples interpolating with S in a group homomorphism and its complement
n-S-GHI Problem (n-S-Group Homomorphism Interpolation Problem):
The success probability of an n-S-GHI solver A is denoted by Succ n-S-GHI
Instance Generation: The instance T is generated according to one of the two following ways and is denoted T 0 or T 1 , respectively. Following T 0 , an n-tuple of points is picked uniformly at random in the language L GHI (n, S). Following T 1 , an n-tuple of points is picked uniformly at random in (G × H ) n . Problem: Decide whether the instance T is of type T 0 or T 1 .
The advantage of an n-S-GHID distinguisher D is given by
The uniform distribution in L GHI (n, S) does not seem easy to produce in general. However, when S uniquely determines a homomorphism f , one can generate T 0 by picking the x i 's uniformly at random and setting
We will only consider n-S-GHI and n-S-GHID problems with a set S which interpolate in a unique group homomorphism. The n-S-GHI problem consists in evaluating the uniquely defined homomorphism on n elements. The n-S-GHID problem essentially consists in deciding whether all points of T lie in its graph. Later, in Sect. 4.2, we will provide instances of GHI and GHID problems.
Related Computational Problems
We also consider the following problems. 
d-G-MGGD
Parameters: An Abelian group G and a positive integer d.
Group Expert When a participant has a key to run a polynomial-time algorithm to solve the (d, S 1 )-MSR and the d-G-Root problems, we say that it is a group expert
for G relative to (d, S 1 ).
Preliminaries
This subsection is devoted to technical lemmas related to the interpolation of group homomorphisms. In particular, we provide some criteria for a set to interpolate in at most one group homomorphism, and we show how to sample elements uniformly. 
Uniqueness of the Interpolation
f : G −→ H such that f (x i ) = y i for all i = 1, . . . , s.
There exists a unique group homomorphism
ϕ : G −→ H such that ϕ(x i ) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , s, namely ϕ = 0. 3. The set Hom(G/G , H ) of all group homomorphisms from G/G to H is restricted to {0}. 4. gcd(#(G/G ), d) = 1. 5. G + dG = G. 6. The cosets x 1 + dG, . . . , x s + dG span G/dG.
Proof. 1 ⇒ 2 This directly follows by choosing
2 ⇒ 1 Assume that there exist two group homomorphisms
Then, by assertion 2, we deduce that the group homomorphism f 1 − f 2 must be equal to the homomorphism 0.
2 ⇒ 3 Suppose that there exists a homomorphismφ : G/G → H which is not equal to 0. Let π G : G → G/G denote the canonical projection. We define the homomorphism ϕ =φ • π G from G to H . By definition, π G (x i ) = 0, and therefore ϕ(x i ) = 0 for any i = 1, . . . , s. Moreover, since π G is onto andφ is not trivial, ϕ must be different from 0, which contradicts assertion 2.
3 ⇒ 4 Suppose the existence of a common prime factor p of #(G/G ) and d. Then, from the structure of Abelian groups, G/G and H must both possess one cyclic subgroup U and V , respectively, of order p. Let λ denote the exponent of the group G/G . By the structure of Abelian groups, we can choose U of the form λ /p · (G/G ). Hence, we have a group homomorphism
which is onto. So, we can define a nontrivial homomorphism which is the composition of ϕ and the isomorphism between U and V . This contradicts 3.
By assertion 5, we can write x = a 1 x 1 + · · · + a s x s + dr for some integers a 1 , . . . , a s and an element r ∈ G. Thus, ϕ(x) = dϕ(r) = 0. This holds for any x ∈ G, i.e., ϕ = 0. Note that the criteria 4-6 suggest that H is only involved by the prime factors in its order. Later, the smallest prime factor p will play an important role. Note also that if G = H , these criteria mean that x 1 , . . . , x s generate G. Furthermore, from assertion 6 we see that
⇔ 6 This follows from
G + dG = G ⇔ {x + dG | x ∈ G } = G/dG.S 1 ∈ L MGGD (d, G) is equivalent to, say, that S 1 H -generate G.
Existence of the Interpolation
Here is a condition allowing one to determine whether a set of points interpolates in a group homomorphism. The following result assumes that the G-coordinates of this set of points H -generate G so that the group homomorphism is unique when it exists. Proof. "⇒" By assumption, there exists a homomorphism f :
"⇐" By assertion 5 of Lemma 4.3, we know that any element x ∈ G can be written in the form x = dr + a 1 x 1 + · · · + a s x s for some integers a 1 , . . . , a s and an element r ∈ G. We now define a function f : G → H such that f (dr + a 1 x 1 + · · · + a s x s ) = a 1 y 1 + · · · + a s y s for any a 1 , . . . , a s ∈ Z and r ∈ G. It remains to prove that f is well defined on G and that it is homomorphic. Assume that an element x ∈ G admits two different representations, i.e.,
By assumption, we must have (a 1 − a 1 )y 1 + · · · + (a s − a s )y s = 0, and therefore
Finally, the homomorphic property of f follows from the linearity in the a i 's. 
Examples of GHI and GHID Problems
We can often meet the GHI and GHID problems in cryptography as the following examples suggest. Here, we exclusively consider 1-GHI and 1-GHID variants.
Example 4.8 (DL parameters)
. We take a cyclic group G of order q, H = Z q , and a generator g of G. The set S = {(g, 1)} interpolates in a unique group homomorphism, and the GHI problem is exactly the discrete logarithm problem. The GHID problem is easy.
Example 4.9 (DH parameters). We take a cyclic group G = H of order q and a generator g of G. For any a ∈ Z q , S = {(g, ag)} interpolates in a unique group homomorphism: the exponentiation to the power a. The GHI and GHID problems correspond to the Diffie-Hellman problem [22] and the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem with static key a.
Example 4.10 (QR parameters).
Let n = pq be such that p, q are different odd primes and H = {−1, +1}. We let x 1 , x 2 ∈ Z * n be such that x 1 is a quadratic residue modulo p and not modulo q and that x 2 is a quadratic residue modulo q, and not modulo p. We notice that S = {(x 1 , 1), (x 2 , −1)} interpolates in a unique group homomorphism which is the Legendre symbol (·/p). Since it is easy to compute (·/n), the quadratic residuosity problem [27] with the information x 1 and x 2 is equivalent to the GHI and GHID problems.
Example 4.11 (RSA parameters). Here, we consider the well-known RSA cryptosystem [51] . Let n = pq be an RSA modulus, and G = H = Z * n . Let f : Z * n → Z * n be defined by f (x) = x e mod n for an exponent e such that gcd(e, ϕ(n)) = 1. Given enough many pairs (x e i mod n, x i ) ∈ Z * n × Z * n , i = 1, . . . , s, such that the first coordinates generate Z * n , the RSA problem corresponds to the GHI problem with S composed of the above pairs and e known. If e is known, the GHID problem is easy in this case.
Example 4.12 (BDH parameters)
. We show here how we can apply the GHI problem to the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP). This problem was used in the seminal paper of Boneh and Franklin [7, 8] to propose an identity-based encryption scheme based on it. Letê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear, nondegenerate and computable mapping, where G 1 and G 2 are cyclic groups of a large prime order p. Let P be a generator of G 1 ; we can state the BDHP as follows: given three random elements aP , bP and cP ∈ G 1 , computeê(P , P ) abc . (G 1 resp. G 2 is written additively resp. multiplicatively.) BDHP is equivalent to the GHI problem with the set S = {(P ,ê(aP , bP ))} and x 1 = cP when S is refreshed for each instance with some a and b picked uniformly at random in Z p . [48] that maps an element (x, y) ∈ Z n × Z * n to the element g x · y n mod n 2 of Z * n 2 , with g an element of Z * n 2 of order n. For such a g, the Paillier trapdoor function is an isomorphism. Thus, assuming that we have s pairs of plaintext/ciphertext that generate Z n × Z * n resp. Z * n 2 , the decryption problem of a challenged ciphertext corresponds to the GHI problem with G = Z * n 2 and H = Z n × Z * n . This application of GHI problem to the decryption problem can be adapted to every homomorphic trapdoor function. Again, if the public key is known, the GHID problem is easy.
Example 4.13 (Paillier parameters). Let us consider the Paillier trapdoor function
Note that Examples 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13 include trapdoors in order to interpolate the group homomorphism. Furthermore, Example 4.10 includes a trapdoor in order to solve the MSR and 2-G-Root problems, thus to make a group expert relative to any (2, S 1 ). Also note that the order d of H is publicly known in Examples 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.12. It is further quite small in Example 4.10. We will also consider the following example inspired by [1] .
Example 4.14 (Newton parameters). Let n = pq be such that p = rd + 1 and q are prime, gcd(r, d) = 1, gcd(q − 1, d) = 1, with d small prime. We take G = Z * n and H = Z d . We can easily compute a group homomorphism by first raising to the power r(q − 1), then computing a discrete logarithm in a small cyclic subgroup of order d.
Our construction for a signature scheme requires the hardness of the GHI problem (for unforgeability), the hardness of the GHID problem (for invisibility), a trapdoor for interpolation (for computability), d publicly known, and sometimes a group expertise. So, in what follows, we focus on DH, QR, BDH, and Newton parameters in Examples 4.9, 4.10, 4.12, 4.14, respectively. 
Proof. Let x, x ∈ G and y = f (x). The lemma follows by noticing that f (x ) = y if and only if x ∈ x + Ker(f ).
We provide a useful lemma to sample group elements. 
Lemma 4.16. Let G, H , d be defined as in Lemma
Remark 4.17. Lemma 4.16 also holds if d is replaced by the exponent λ of the group H .
Note that a group expert relative to (d, {x 1 , . . . , x s }) knows how to invert g in Lemma 4.16. We show here that this ability even allows us to pick an element in g −1 (x) uniformly at random for any x ∈ G.
Because ϕ is balanced, it is enough to sample an element of h −1 (x). For that, we only need one element, and we can randomize it by adding a random element from h −1 (0). For that, we pick a tuple τ ∈ U G × Z s nd , apply our group expertise, and retrieve a tuple t ∈ g −1 (h(τ )). We can then compute τ − ψ(t ) where ψ(t ) is any function such that ϕ • ψ is the identity mapping. Finally, we obtain
The representation t is uniformly distributed in g −1 (x).
Approximations of the Homomorphism
In this subsection we present a hardness result of approximation related to the existence of a homomorphism which interpolates a set of points. This is inspired by the theory of checkable proofs [2, 3] . 
Lemma 4.18. Given two finite Abelian groups G and H , and a set of s points
Then, for any x ∈ G and any y ∈ H , we have
for a constant δ ≤ 1/p. Therefore, for any x ∈ G and any function f : G → H , we have (r, a 1 , . . . , a s ) ∈ U x }. Here, we remark that for any tuple (a 1 , . . . , a s ) ∈ V x , there exists the same number of elements r ∈ G such that (r, a 1 , . . . , a s ) ∈ U x . Namely, this number is equal to the cardinality of the kernel of the homomorphism r → dr defined on G, which is equal to #G/#dG. 
The set of points S interpolates in a group homomorphism. Furthermore, given x ∈ U G, the value y = f (x) matches the unique interpolation with probability ρ.
The above result can be extended to the computability of the homomorphism. Similarly as above and using techniques of linear cryptanalysis [31] , one can efficiently amplify such a function f to compute the homomorphism with a negligible error probability. More details can be found in [40, 41] .
A 4-Move ZK Protocol for GHI and coGHI
In this section, we develop some interactive proof protocols for GHI and coGHI under the assumption that group expert algorithm exists.
Let G, H be parameters of a GHID problem. Let ∈ N be a security parameter. We note that "T interpolates with S" is equivalent to "S ∪ T interpolates," and so we use a single set N as input without loss of generality. We present here an interactive proof of membership in which a prover wants to convince a verifier that N interpolates in a group homomorphism f : G −→ H used as a witness. This protocol is denoted GHIproof (N ) and is depicted below. 5. The verifier checks that the commitment is opened correctly, i.e.,
If this is the case, the verifier accepts the proof. Otherwise, he rejects it.
The commitment scheme is crucial to achieve zero-knowledge, since it allows the prover to disclose the answers v i 's after having checked that the verifier generated the challenges correctly. Otherwise, a malicious verifier could use the prover as an oracle to evaluate the function f on any element of G. Note also that the parameter corresponds to the number of challenges sent by the verifier and is thus directly related to the security level of GHIproof. For asymptotic security, this one can be seen as a function of a global security parameter k. 
Proof. Completeness is trivial.
Soundness By Corollary 4.19, if the set N does not admit any interpolating homomorphism, it is impossible to find any procedure to deduce w i = n j =1 a i,j e j from u i = dr i + n j =1 a i,j g j with probability greater than 1/p, for any i = 1, . . . , . Since the challenges u i 's are generated independently, no prover is able to find the correct w = (w 1 , . . . , w ) from the challenge u = (u 1 , . . . , u ) with probability greater than p − . Below, we show that a (cheating) prover P * must break the binding property of Commit with nonzero probability in order to succeed in the protocol with a probability ε > p − .
We construct below a simulator B who interacts with P * and plays the role of an honest verifier. The simulator will launch two protocol runs sequentially with P * in such a way that a collision on Commit can be found with a certain probability. For this, he rewinds the prover to play twice with the same inputs, coins, and challenge. We stress that this is allowed as long as the prover receives messages which are correctly distributed in both runs of the protocol. So, if we look at both runs separately, the prover cannot see any difference from an interaction with an honest verifier.
The simulator B picks some coefficients a i,j 's and r i 's uniformly at random and computes the challenges u i 's. He then sends u to P * . This one answers a committed value com. The simulator releases the coefficients a i,j 's and r i 's to P * . At the end, P * succeeds if he opens the commitment correctly on the values w i 's. If he does not succeed, the simulator aborts. Otherwise, using his group expertise, the simulator finds some coefficients a * i,j 's and r * i 's that satisfy It remains to compute the probability that this event occurs. At first, we note that the simulations are perfect in both runs of the protocol. Namely, if we look at both protocol runs independently, we remark that all coefficients r i , a i,j are chosen uniformly at random. We now have to take into account that rewinding the prover with the same random tape and the same challenges is a restriction in the space of all possible protocol runs. So, we decompose the probability of success according to the random tape of P and challenges u. Note that once the random tape and the challenge are fixed, both protocol runs are independent.
Let A be the probability event that P * succeeds in the first protocol run, and E ,u be the event that the random tape is and the challenge is u. Similarly, we define the same event A * for the second protocol run. We set Pr[A|E ,u ] = Pr[A * |E ,u ] = ε ,u . We also denote by B the event that w = w * , where w * = (w * 1 , . . . , w * ). Since A and A * conditioned to E ,u are independent, we have
From this we deduce that
Note that Pr[¬B|A, E ,u ] ≤ p − by Lemma 4.18: no matter the values of u and w, picking the a * and r * leading to the same u at random will give the same w * = w with probability bounded by p − . Hence, Pr[A ∧ ¬B|E ,u ] ≤ ε ,u p − . We obtain that
Applying Jensen's inequality, we obtain
where ε is the probability that P * passes the proof with a honest verifier. This leads us to the desired result.
Zero-Knowledge
We construct a black-box simulator B which is given an instance T ∈ L GHI (n, S), the public key K V p of the verifier, and an auxiliary input z for the malicious verifier V * . As usual, we let N = S ∪ T . 
which is 2. So, we rewind only once on average and the simulator has a polynomial average complexity.
Nontransferability Following the definition of nontransferability, the malicious prover P * is given the trapdoor K V s of the commitment. So, after receiving the challenge u = (u 1 , . . . , u ) from V * , he can make a junk commitment by picking w = (w 1 , . . . , w ) ∈ U H uniformly at random and computing com = Commit(K V p , w ; dec ). Then he can send com to V * . Then, the verifier sends the values r i 's and a i,j 's to P * . He can check whether these values satisfy u i = dr i + n j =1 a i,j g j for i = 1, . . . , . If it is not the case, he answers abort. If it is the case, he deduces the right tuple w and computes dec ← Equivocate(K V s , w, com ). He then sends w, dec to open the commitment com . Note that in this case, the transcript of this interaction is (u, com , r i 'n, a i,j 'n, w, dec). Since the commitment is perfectly hiding, the transcript has exactly the same distribution as a transcript produced between an honest prover and the verifier V * .
Let G, H , and S = { (g 1 , e 1 ), . . . , (g s , e s ) } ⊆ G × H be parameters of a GHID problem, and let d be the order of H with smallest prime factor p. Let T = { (x 1 , z 1 ) , . . . , (x t , z t )} ⊆ G × H be a set of t points. We assume that S interpolates in a unique group homomorphism f : G → H . A prover wants to convince a verifier that T ∈ L GHI (t, S). For this, the prover makes use of the knowledge of a group homomorphism f uniquely interpolating S. Let ∈ N be a security parameter. He performs the following interaction with a verifier. Parameters: G, H, d, p, , B such that 1 < B ≤ p and B polynomially bounded. Common input: S = { (g 1 , e 1 ), . . . , (g s , e s ) }, T = { (x 1 , z 1 ) , . . . , (x t , z t )} ⊆ G × H , the public key K V p of the verifier. 1 , . . . , u ,t ) and w = (w 1,1 , . . . , w ,t ). He sends u and w to the prover. 5. The verifier checks that the prover has found the right λ and that the commitment is correctly opened by checking com = Commit(K V p , λ; dec). If this is the case, the verifier accepts the proof. Otherwise, he rejects it.
coGHIproof (S, T )
Witness input: f such that f (g i ) = e i , i = 1, . . . , s. We let y k = f (x k ), k = 1, . . . , t. 1. The verifier picks r i,k ∈ U G, a i,j,k ∈ U Z d , and λ i ∈ U {0, 1, . . . , B − 1} for i = 1, . . . , , j = 1, . . . , s, k = 1, . . . , t. He computes u i,k = dr i,k + s j =1 a i,j,k g j + λ i x k and w i,k = s j =1 a i,j,k e j + λ i z k for all i and k. Set u = (u 1,
The prover computes
v i,k = f (u i,k ) for i = 1, . . . , , k = 1, . . . , t. By the equation w i,k − v i,k = λ i (z k − y k ),
Remark 4.21.
Provided that the discrete logarithm in H is easy, we can take B = p and replace exhaustive search on λ i by a discrete logarithm algorithm.
This protocol was inspired from the denial protocol of Gennaro et al. [24] . This one can actually be seen as a special case of ours with the RSA encryption function as homomorphism.
We also notice that λ was chosen such that it can uniquely be retrieved from every nonzero values of H that can be taken by the elements z k − y k 's. This is shown by the following result. H , d, p as above, and a, b ∈ H such that b = 
Lemma 4.22. Let
Proof. Completeness is trivial.
Soundness We first remark that u i,k is uniformly distributed for any fixed λ i for i = 1, . . . , and k = 1, . . . , t by Lemma 4.16. Moreover, if the set of points T interpolates in f , we have that f (x k ) = z k for all k = 1, . . . , t. By the homomorphic property of f , we have f (u i,k ) = w i,k for any i and k. Putting all together implies that the distribution of the challenge (u i,k , w i,k ) is completely independent of the value λ i for any i and k. Thus, a prover cannot deduce the right λ i 's with a probability greater than B − from the challenges. Below, we show how we can break the binding property of Commit using a prover succeeding with a probability ε > B − . To this, we proceed similarly as for proving the soundness of GHIproof. We run the protocol once with the prover, rewind this one, and run the protocol with carefully chosen coefficients.
The simulator B first picks the values a i,j,k 's, r i,k 's, and λ i 's uniformly at random and computes the tuples u = (u 1,1 , . . . , u ,t ) and w = (w 1,1 , . . . , w ,t ) according to the protocol. Then, B sends u, w to the prover P * . This one answers com. The simulator releases the coefficients a i,j,k 's, r i,k 's, λ i 's, and the prover succeeds if he opens com on λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ ) . Now, B picks λ * = (λ * 1 , . . . , λ * ) uniformly at random. By using his group expertise, he is able to find some uniformly random coefficients a * i,j,k 's, r * i,k 's satisfying Note that B simulates an honest verifier perfectly in both protocol runs. We can compute the success probability that B finds a collision for Commit in a very similar way as for GHIproof. Namely, we decompose the probability of success for the different random tapes and challenges u. Let ε ,u be the probability that the prover wins in one protocol run with the random tape and the challenge u (and thus w = f (u)). Since the probability that λ = λ * for any random tape and challenge u is equal to B − , we can show as for GHIproof that the success probability of B is higher than
where q ,u denotes the probability that the protocol runs with the random tape and the challenge u. Again, applying Jensen's inequality leads to the desired bound ε(ε − B − ).
Zero-Knowledge
The simulation works as in GHIproof. One can rewind the verifier and achieve perfect zero-knowledge. We can just check that λ is uniquely defined by u and w. Indeed, if V * provides (after rewinding once) two sets (r, a, λ) and (r * , a * , λ * ) with same u and w, we obtain that
for all i and k. So, if f (x k ) = z k , we obtain that λ i = λ * i for all i.
Nontransferability The simulation works as in GHIproof. One can use the trapdoor of the commitment scheme to open the commitment on the desired value (correct answer).
A Two-Move ZK Protocol for GHI and coGHI in the Random Oracle Model
Below, we propose a two-move variant of GHIproof. This variant is achieved by removing the two messages sent in the middle of the protocol which allow us to achieve zero-knowledge through the commitment scheme. In order to maintain zero-knowledge, the verifier sends a kind of commitment on a seed which generates the coefficients producing the challenges sent to the prover. This commitment can only be opened by the prover after this one solved these challenges. For this, we introduce a pseudorandom generator Gen and a cryptographic hash function denoted Gen which will be modeled by random oracles. We notably add a trapdoor one-way permutation with associated secret key K V s in order to obtain nontransferability. This two-move protocol called 2GHIproof is described here. Note that the secret key K V s of the verifier is unused in the protocol. Its availability will be used to prove nontransferability.
2GHIproof (N )
The two-move variant has a very similar complexity as the four-move ones. In particular, the prover needs to perform the same number of homomorphism evaluations. The computational work related to Commit is replaced by the one induced by Gen, Gen , TPOW.
Theorem 4.24. We consider the above 2GHIproof protocol with parameters G, H , d, , k. We assume that Gen and Gen are random oracles and that TPOW is a trapdoor one-way permutation defined on domain {0, 1} k . 2GHIproof(S ∪ T ) is a ZK argument of membership for T ∈ L GHI (n, S).
More precisely, we have the following properties. 
Let p be the smallest prime factor of d. The protocol is sound: There is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
Proof. Completeness is trivial.
Soundness Let P * be a cheating prover who wants to pass the protocol with common input N which does not interpolate in a group homomorphism. We let K V p and K V s be the keys for the verifier, and we assume that P * ↔ V accepts with probability ε.
When interacting with a honest verifier, P * wins if and only if it responds by seed such that TPOW(K V p , seed) = ϑ . Note that it is easy to check whether a value seed is equal to seed because TPOW is deterministic. Without loss of generality, we can assume that P * never queries seed to Gen (indeed, he can first check if this is the correct answer before querying). Similarly, we can assume that P * always responds correctly whenever he queries the right w = (w 1 , . . . , w ) to Gen because he can check that Gen (w) ⊕ h is the correct seed. Therefore, P * always wins if the correct w is queried to Gen and never queries seed to Gen.
We transform P * into an algorithm A inverting TPOW(K V p , ·) as follows. 1. A receives a random challenge ϑ whose preimage by TPOW is denoted seed. The goal of A is to find seed. 2. A generates some random values r i 's and a i,j 's and deduces the corresponding u i 's and w i 's. A further picks a random h. Then (u, h, ϑ) is a challenge for the prover, and A can start simulating P * . Clearly, given a random Gen and Gen , the simulation for P * is perfect as long as seed is not queried to Gen and w is not queried to Gen . Since the former case never happens, A simulates P * and stops if w is queried to Gen . In this case, A just fails. 3. The simulation of P * leads to either a failure or a release of the correct value seed which can be returned by A.
The algorithm succeeds to invert the trapdoor permutation at the condition that (event A) P * succeeds without querying w to Gen . Let B be the event that P * queries w to Gen . We transform P * into an algorithm B as follows.
1. B receives a random challenge u. 2. B then picks a random seed, computes ϑ = TPOW(K V p , seed), and picks a random h. Additionally, B picks an integer ∈ {1, . . . , q Gen } uniformly at random. Then (u, h, ϑ) is a challenge for the prover, and B can start simulating P * .
Clearly, the simulation works just like for A as long as P * does not query Gen with the response w to the game. So, B just let P * query Gen for the − 1 first queries and stops at the th one. The value w of this last query is returned as the response to the game. 3. If the simulation P * stops, then B just fails.
Clearly, B wins if and only if event B occurs and the simulator has guessed which of the queries by P * gave the correct answer. Therefore, B wins with probability 1/q Gen · Pr [B] . By Corollary 4.19, this probability is at most p − , which implies that Pr[B] ≤ q Gen p − . So, the confirmation cannot succeed with probability larger than Succ inv-tp + q Gen p − .
Zero-Knowledge
We want to construct a simulator B V * ,Gen,Gen using any verifier V * as a subroutine to simulate the view from V * in the protocol. One problem is that V * may not have K V s as an input by definition. So, we cannot assume that the simulator has it. B runs the verifier V * and looks at the queries made by V * to the oracle Gen. B puts these q Gen queries seed k for 1 ≤ k ≤ q Gen and the corresponding answers of Gen in memory. The simulator then receives the first message M of V * . If this one has not a correct format, the simulator outputs the abort view (N, K V p , z, r V , abort). Otherwise, the simulator checks whether one answer among those queries seed k 's made to Gen generates the challenges u i 's correctly and the image of this query by TPOW is equal to ϑ . If it is not the case, B outputs the abort view. Otherwise, the simulator is able to compute the right w i 's from this answer (the right r i 's and a i,j 's). From the w i 's, B computes seed * = h ⊕ Gen (w 1 , . . . , w ) and checks whether seed * generates the right r i 's and a i,j 's. In the positive case, B outputs the view (N, K V p , z, r V , seed * ). In the negative case, it outputs the abort view.
It remains to show that the two view distributions are statistically indistinguishable. When the first message has not a correct format, the two transcripts are clearly identical. Let consider the case where the verifier did not query any seed k which produces the challenges u i 's and whose image by TPOW leads to ϑ . In this case, the honest prover will not abort the protocol only if he retrieves a seed = Gen (w 1 , . . . , w ) ⊕ h which generates the challenges u i 's and ϑ . This occurs only if the verifier V * was able to guess that the output values of the query seed to the oracle Gen generate the right r i 's and a ij 's. Since Gen is a random oracle, no polynomial-time verifier V * can succeed to do that with a nonnegligible probability. We still have to consider the case where the verifier queried a seed k which produces the challenges u i 's and ϑ . We see that the two transcripts are always identical, since the simulator clearly knows the answer of the honest prover by learning the right w i 's. Therefore, we can conclude that the two transcript distributions are statistically indistinguishable.
Nontransferability We now want to construct an online prover simulator P * which would be undistinguishable from the real one, provided that it is given the correct K V s . Based on receiving the (u, h, ϑ) challenge, if the format is incorrect, then P * aborts. Otherwise, P * can compute seed = TPOW −1 (K V s , ϑ), then check whether u and h are well computed from seed. If correct, P * can eventually respond with seed. Clearly, the simulation is perfect.
The interactive coGHIproof protocol can be transformed in a two-move protocol in a similar way as for GHIproof. This variant called 2coGHIproof is presented below.
2coGHIproof (S, T ) Parameters: G, H, d, p, , k, B such that 1 < B ≤ p and B polynomially
bounded. Random oracles: e 1 ) , . . . , (g s , e s )}, T = { (x 1 , z 1 ) , . . . , (x t , z t )} ⊆ G × H , the public key K V p of the verifier.
1. The verifier picks seed ∈ U {0, 1} k and, by applying a pseudorandom generator Gen on this seed, generates values
Using a cryptographic hash function Gen , the verifier computes h = Gen (λ 1 , . . . , λ ) ⊕ seed. Set u = (u 1,1 , . . . , u ,t ) and w = (w 1,1 , . . . , w ,t ) . He sends u, w, h, and ϑ to the prover. 2. The prover computes v i,k = f (u i,k ) for i = 1, . . . , , k = 1, . . . , Proof. This proof is very similar to the one of Theorem 4.24.
A NIZK for MGGD
Let G, d be some parameters, and S 1 some input of a d-G-MGGD problem. We propose here a noninteractive proof in which a prover proves that S 1 = {g 1 , . . . , g s } Hgenerate G, for any group H of order d. In other words, by assertion 5 of Lemma 4.3 this corresponds to show that S 1 + dG = G or by assertion 6 of the same lemma that the answer to the d-G-MGGD problem is positive. For this, the prover must be a group expert relative to (d, S 1 ).
We first introduce a technical result. 
Then, we have
Proof. First, we notice that if gcd(#G, d) = 1, we have dG = G, which trivially leads to S 1 + dG = G. Now, assuming that gcd(#G, d) = 1, there exists a smallest prime p such that p |#G and p |d. Consider now the unique prime factor decomposition
i , where q 1 < q 2 < · · · < q k . Note that p = q for an integer ≤ k. By the structure of the Abelian groups, we have
. This shows that the structure of dG is of the form
, which is either 1 or something greater or equal to p . By the existence of f , we have #G/#K < p ≤ p , which implies that G = K.
We make use of a pseudorandom generator GenM modeled by a random oracle. Let ∈ N be a security parameter. This protocol called NIMGGDproof is depicted below.
1. The prover picks seedM ∈ U {0, 1} k m uniformly at random and using the pseudorandom generator GenM produces some challenges GenM(G, seedM) = (x 1 , . . . , x ). Then, using his group expertise, he finds r i ∈ G and a i,1 , . . . , a i,s ∈ Z d such that
He sends seedM and the coefficients r i 's and a i,j 's to the verifier. 2. Using GenM, the verifier generates x 1 , . . . , x from seedM. He checks whether
Note that the G occurrence in GenM(G, seedM) means that GenM must be fed with the description and representation of G. This is to make sure that it was chosen before generating the elements and avoid problems like in ECDSA [54] . L MGGD (d, G) . More precisely, we have the following properties.
1. NIMGGDproof is sound: for any set S 1 such that S 1 + dG = G, any cheating prover P * limited to q GenM queries to GenM has a success probability
NIMGGDproof is perfect noninteractive black-box zero-knowledge in the random oracle model.
Proof. Completeness is trivial.
Soundness We describe here a simulator B who uses P * in order to win the following game. Without loss of generality, we assume that P * does not submit the same query more than once.
Game: A challenger picks x i ∈ U G uniformly at random for i = 1, . . . , and sends x 1 , . . . , x to B. The simulator wins if he is able to find coefficients r i 's and a i,j 's such that
. . , . The simulator first receives x = (x 1 , . . . , x ) according to the above game and runs P * . B picks an integer n ∈ U {1, . . . , q GenM } uniformly at random. The GenM queries made by P * are simulated by maintaining a list of the queries and corresponding answers. Upon queries, the simulator outputs a uniformly random answer and adds the new pair in the list. However, we handle the nth query in a special way. Namely, we answer x to this query. Since x was picked uniformly at random, B simulates the oracle GenM perfectly. At the end, P * outputs a seed seedM and coefficients r i 's and a i,j 's. The simulator forwards the same coefficients to his challenger.
Let A be the event "B wins the game." By Lemma 4.26, Pr[A] ≤ p − . We also note that event A occurs only if P * sends seedM as nth query made to GenM. Let B be the event "P * queried seedM to GenM," and C be the event "P * succeeds". We have
Since GenM is a random oracle, Pr[¬B ∧ C] ≤ (#G) − , because the prover needs to guess x which corresponds to some seedM. Putting all together leads to
which concludes the proof.
Noninteractive Zero-Knowledge We describe a simulator B who simulates the message sent by an honest prover. Although the verifier V * does not send any message here, the simulator needs to simulate the random oracle GenM which can be queried by V * . B picks r i ∈ U G, a i,j ∈ U Z d and computes
The simulator picks seedM ∈ U {0, 1} k m uniformly at random and adds the pair (seedM, x) , where x = (x 1 , . . . , x ) in a list maintained to simulate GenM. Then, the simulator can run V * and sends him seedM and the coefficients r i 's, a i,j 's. B simulates GenM as usual by maintaining a list of the previous queries and corresponding answers. For any new query, the simulator simply picks the answer uniformly at random. The simulation is done perfectly since seedM was added in the list before the first query made by V * .
A 0-Move Proof for MGGD
We can further reduce the proof by making sure that almost all instances belong to the language. A first idea consists in including the NIZK in the instance so that instances become self-proven. Another idea can be used in order to relax the group expert assumption which is needed in the NIMGGDproof protocol. For this, we provide a proof that the instance was randomly generated. The instance is generated by GenK (G, seedK) = (g 1 , . . . , g s ) .
The value seedK is added in the instance as a proof and actually replaces it as the instance is fully defined by seedK. We essentially use two different approaches. The first one consists of having instances long enough so that it is hard to generate a bad instance offline. The second one consists of having a TTP to select the random seed and an instance so that it is hard to generate a bad instance online. The latter approach requires using a certificate for proper generation of the seed.
We start by the following technical lemma.
Lemma 4.28. Let A be a finite Abelian p-group such that
The number of maximal subgroups of A, i.e., of order p e−1 is equal to (p k − 1)/(p − 1).
Proof. According to some results in combinatorial theory (see [37, p. 87 ] quoted in Butler [13] ), the number of subgroups of A of order p is equal to those of order p e− , for any integer < e. Hence, our problem can be solved by enumerating all subgroups of A of order p. For this, we consider all elements of A of order p. Since any group Z p e i contains exactly p elements of order p or which are 0 for i = 1, . . . , k, we have p k − 1 elements in A of order p (we just need to remove the neutral element). To conclude, it suffices to remark that any subgroup generated by an element of order p is in fact generated by p − 1 such elements. elements g 1 , . . . , g s ∈ U G picked uniformly at random H -generate G satisfies
where P d is the set of all prime factors of gcd(#G, d), and k q is the rank of the maximal q-subgroup of G: Given a prime q, the q-subgroup of G is the subgroup A q of elements whose orders are powers of q. The rank k q is the integer such that there exists a unique sequence of integers a q, 1 
Proof. By the assertion 6 of Lemma 4.3, we need to study the probability to generate the quotient group G/(d · G) with some elements picked uniformly at random. Classical results on the structure of Abelian groups states the decomposition
We consider B q = A q /dA q and study the probability that elements generate this group. If gcd(d, q) = 1, then dA q = A q , and B q is trivial. So, we only focus on the q's that divide d and denote e q the largest integer such that q e q |d. We deduce that the structure of B q satisfies
where r is the largest integer such that a q,r < e q . The probability P q that s elements do not generate B q is equal to the probability that these elements stay in one of the maximal subgroups of B q . By Lemma 4.28, the number of such subgroups is equal to (q k q − 1)/(q − 1). Therefore,
Since these events are independent for the different B q 's, the final probability is obtained by multiplying the terms 1 − P q .
Remark 4.30. As an application, if d is prime and if the
In practice, we will rarely have k greater than 2 so that we approximately have a probability of 1 − d −s+1 .
MOVA Scheme
Description
We present our scheme called MOVA which is based on a secret group homomorphism. This scheme was first proposed at ASIACRYPT '04 [41] and was inspired by a preliminary version restricted to group characters (with a less efficient denial protocol) presented at PKC '04 [42] .
Since MOVA is generic, the precise setup algorithms are not specified. In addition to this, several variants are proposed depending on whether key registration is used and on whether a group expertise can be used. Depending on the situation, one will be preferred on the others. Concrete instances are discussed in Sect. 5.3. Domain Parameters. To formally comply with asymptotic definitions of security properties, the above parameters can be seen as polynomial functions of one single global security parameter k. We let integers Lkey, Lsig, Icon, Iden be polynomial security parameters as well as "group ensembles" for Xgroup and Ygroup. The group ensembles should define groups, representation of elements with polynomial length, and polynomial-time addition, inversion, and comparison algorithms. An optional parameter Ival ∈ N is used for variant using NIMGGDproof.
Primitives. We use two deterministic pseudorandom generators GenK and GenS (modeled by some random oracles) which produce elements of Xgroup. We consider a trapdoor one-way permutation TPOW. The associated key pair
is that of the verifier. We also use additional random oracles specified in protocols given in Sect. 4 , where opt is an optional string which can be used to check the K S p validity in the setup variants. We always implicitly assume that the participants check this string before using a public key. We use (Xkey 1 , . . . , Xkey Lkey ) = GenK(Xgroup, seedK) and Ykey j = Hom(Xkey j ) for j = 1, . . . , Lkey. Validate. The first two options consist of using the 0MGGDproof verification algorithm.
Either it is based on a long key (so the public key only includes a seed), or it is based on a TTP-certified seed (in which case the public key also includes a certificate for the seed). A third option consists of verifying the NIZK as specified in the NIMGGDproof Ival protocol which must be included in the public key. Signature Generation. Let m be a message to sign. The signer generates 
He then computes Ysig
k = Hom(Xsig k ) for k = 1, . . . , Lsig. The signature is σ = (Ysig 1 , . . . , Ysig Lsig ).
It is
The protocol options are threefold. First, we can choose the 4-Move or the 2-Move option for the GHI or coGHI proofs. One difference is that the 2-Move option requires random oracles instead of a trapdoor commitment. In addition to this, the 4-Move option requires a group expert algorithm to exist (although it shall not necessarily be known by the signer). Since the signature itself requires random oracles we found no advantage in using the 4-Move option, and so we concentrate on the 2-Move one. Second, we can choose to have nontransferability (in which case we need keys for the verifier) or not. If nontransferability is not a concern, we can get rid of the key pair for the verifier and no longer use a trapdoor one-way permutation. Finally, there are three options for the validate algorithm. We can use the 0MGGDproof using either a long key or a TTPcertified seed. Another choice, when group experts exist, consists of expanding the public key with a NIZK (the NIMGGDproof protocol). The selection of the NT versus non-NT and the Validate option span into six possible settings:
Lkey long TTP Group expert
Security Results
We first prove that the two-move version of the MOVA scheme satisfies the security properties of undeniable signature schemes. The proofs of resistance against forgery attacks and invisibility were inspired from Kurosawa and Heng [33] . 
Proof. The properties of Confirm and Deny come from Theorems in Sects. 4.4-4.5.
Unforgeability Let F be a forger who succeeds to existentially forge a signature under an adaptive chosen-message attack with probability ε . We construct an algorithm B using the forger F and K V s . At the beginning, B receives the challenges x 1 , . . . , x Lsig ∈ Xgroup of the Lsig-S-GHI problem. Then, B runs the forger and simulates the queries to the random oracle GenS, q S queries to the signing oracle Sign and q V queries to the denial/confirmation oracle Ver. We can assume that all messages sent to Sign resp. Ver was previously queried to GenS (since the oracle Sign resp. Ver has to make such queries anyway). B simulates the oracles GenS and Sign as follows:
GenS. B maintains a list of the messages queried to GenS and corresponding answer.
If Invisibility Let D be a distinguisher which breaks the invisibility of the MOVA scheme with an advantage ε. We construct an algorithm B which solves the Lsig-S-GHID problem by using D and K V s . At the beginning, B is challenged with a tuple { (x 1 , y 1 
Lsig for which it has to decide whether Hom(x i ) = y i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ Lsig or if this tuple was picked at random. Like for the proof of the existential forgery, the simulator B runs D and simulates the queries to the random oracle GenS, q S queries to the signing oracle Sign, and the queries to the denial/confirmation oracle Ver. We can assume that each message queried to Sign or Ver was previously queried to the random oracle GenS. We assume that no query m to Ver was submitted to Sign beforehand. (Otherwise, we can just simulate them with K V s .) Let Forge be the event in which D sends a valid message-signature pair to Ver. We first remove all instances for which the event Forge occurs. So, we can now assume that D never submits any valid pair (m, σ ) to Ver such that m was not previously submitted to Sign. B simulates the oracles just like in the proof of unforgeability with = q V + 1 (we excluded valid forged pairs).
After a given time, the distinguisher D sends a message m * to the challenger of the invisibility game which is simulated by B. We can assume that m * was queried to GenS (otherwise B simulates a new query We can conclude by noting that Forge occurs with a probability bounded by e(1 + q S )(1 + q V )ε by assertion 2.
Remark 5.2. Similarly to Laguillaumie and Vergnaud [34] , the efficiency of the security reduction for the existential forgery can be improved (factor (1 + q V ) −1 is removed) by replacing the GHI problem by its gap variant [46] . This problem consists in solving the GHI problem using an access to an oracle which solves the corresponding GHID problem. This one helps to simulate the confirmation and denial oracles. So, we do not need to guess ∈ {1, . . . , q V + 1} to simulate these oracles correctly.
Remark 5.3. MOVA scheme can be made probabilistic so that the invisibility notion defined in Galbraith and Mao [23] is satisfied. To this, it suffices to append some randomness r to the message to sign and to add r in the signature. The drawback is that the signature enlarges.
Parameters, Implementation, and Other Properties
Security results on the unforgeability and the invisibility of MOVA given in Theorem 5.1 allow us to directly derive some bounds on the signature size provided certain assumptions on the GHI and GHID problems. We point out that the hardness of solving GHI and GHID problems can often be scaled by only adjusting the size of Xgroup.
To illustrate this, consider Xgroup = Z * n with n = pq for two large primes p, q and the Legendre symbol (·/p). Solving the corresponding GHI problem requires to solve the quadratic residuosity assumption for which the best known solver algorithm consists in factoring n.
As shown by the above example, the MOVA scheme can be instantiated so that the signature size is fully scalable depending on the required security. In certain cases, we can also select Xgroup such that the hardness of GHI is adjusted to the computational power of the adversary without any impact on the signature size. Namely, we assume here that Xgroup is adjusted such that Since the verification of an undeniable signature must be done online, we can consider some security probabilities of about 2 −20 instead of the classical offline security of 2 −80 .
In Table 1 , we give the required MOVA signature size in order to achieve Succ ef-cma F ≈ 2 −20 depending on q S and q V . We can get the same (except 1 bit due to the factor 2) results for the invisibility. As an example, an application involving q S = 2 10 signatures and up to q V = 2 20 online verifications per key can tolerate a size of Lsig = 52 bits.
Results for the soundness of the two-move confirmation and denial protocols can be obtained using 
p).
We examine here the size of parameters implied by the different setup variants according to their specificity. First, we note that security of Setup Variant using 0-Move proof for MGGD is directly deduced from the results of Theorem 4.29. The main difference is simply due to the number of attempts the adversary can perform until he gets some "bad" elements Xkey 1 , . . . , Xkey Lkey . In the first variant, the signer can try as many attempts as he can so that we require an "offline" probability P gen ≥ 1 − 2 −80 , while in the second one he is very limited so that we require an "online" probability P gen ≥ 1 − 2 −20 . Assuming similar assumptions as in Remark 4.30, we get Lkey = 81/ log 2 (d) for 0-Move with long key variant and Lkey = 21/ log 2 (d) for 0-Move with TTP variant. This means that the tuple (Ykey 1 , . . . , Ykey Lkey ) which is contained in the public key would be 81-and 21-bits long, respectively. As for the soundness of the confirmation and denial protocols, we get a probability that the signer passes the protocol with an invalid public key of 2 −20 with Ival = 20/ log 2 (p) assuming that no efficient adversary breaks the computationally binding property of Commit. Finally, Theorem 4.27 gives results for Setup variant with NIZK for MGGD. Since Xgroup is usually greater than p, we have which leads to a probability of 2 −20 with q GenM = 2 60 and Ival = 80/ log 2 (p).
Potential Instantiations
We briefly discuss some potential instantiations of the homomorphism which allow one to consider short signatures. These ones must have a short group range.
Characters Let n = pq be an RSA modulus. A character on Z * n is a homomorphism from Z * n to C\{0}. We consider some characters χ of order d = 2, 3, 4, i.e., χ d (x) = 1 for any x ∈ Z * n . For d = 2, the nontrivial characters which are assumed hard to compute are both Legendre (Jacobi) symbols (·/p) and (·/q). For d = 3 or 4, the characters correspond to some natural generalization of the Legendre symbols arising in the theory of cubic and quartic residuosity, respectively. The cubic characters require the use of Eisenstein integers, i.e., elements of the form a + bω for a, b ∈ Z and ω = (−1 + √ −3)/2. We require that p ≡ q ≡ 1 (mod 3) and take an Eisenstein integer π such that ππ = p. As a candidate homomorphism, we can take χ π defined by χ π (x) = x (p−1)/3 (mod π) for x ∈ Z * n . Similarly, characters of order 4 arises in the set of Gauss integers Z[i] = {a + bi|a, b ∈ Z}. Choose p ≡ q ≡ 1 (mod 4) and π such that ππ = p. Then, consider χ π defined as χ π (x) = x (p−1)/4 (mod π) for x ∈ Z * n . The cubic and quartic characters can be efficiently (about quadratic time) computed using reciprocity laws as for the quadratic residue. We also note that group expertise for the above characters correspond to the factorization of n. A more detailed treatment on the character instantiations can be found in [40, 42] .
Example 5.4 (QR parameters). As a concrete example, we propose to adopt the Legendre symbol Hom(x) = (x/p) and use Lkey = 21, Lsig = 52, Icon = Iden = 60, Ival = 80, and the 2-Move variant with NIMGGDproof. Under the assumption that q S < 10 3 , q V < 10 6 , and q Gen < 10 12 , we have an online security of 2 20 and an offline security of 2 80 .
Example 5.5 (Newton parameters). Let n be such that n = pq with p = rd + 1, q, d prime, gcd(q − 1, d) = 1, gcd(r, d) = 1, and g generating a subgroup of Z * p . We obtain g by choosing a random element h ∈ Z * n until h satisfies h r mod p = 1, and we set g = h r mod p. Like this, we find a homomorphism by "sending" the input in a hidden cyclic subgroup of order d and then computing its discrete logarithm with respect to the generator g, ϕ : Z * n −→ Z d x −→ log g (x r mod p).
The expert group knowledge is obtained if one knows p and q. Typically, we could use d = 2 20 − 3 = 1 048 573, which is prime, Lkey = 1, Lsig = 3, Icon = Iden = 3, Ival = 4, and the 2-Move variant with NIMGGDproof. Under the assumption that q S < 10 3 , q V < 10 6 , and q Gen < 10 12 , we have an online security of 2 20 and an offline security of 2 80 .
Implementation of the Signature Generation
Here, we finally compare the time required for generating a MOVA signature with different homomorphisms. We consider a signature size of Lsig = 20 bits (except for RSA). We omit the time required by the generation of the values Xsig i 's. Hence, we compare the time required for computing 20 Jacobi symbols (·/p) 2 , 10 quartic residue symbols χ π , one homomorphism based on the discrete logarithm in a hidden subgroup and one RSA homomorphism. We recall that for all these homomorphisms, we take a modulus n of size of 1024 bits. The implementation of all algorithms has been written in C using the GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library (GMP) [25] and was done by Yvonne Anne Oswald in 2005 [47] . The tests have been done on an Intel(R)4 1.4 GHz Desktop Computer with 256 MB RAM. Results are given in Table 2 . To scale these numbers with Lsig = 52, the figures for symbols should be multiplied by 52 20 , the ones for baby-step/giant-step and Pollard discrete logarithm should be multiplied by 52 20 , the one for RSA should be kept as is (the signature is not short), and we should not consider precomputed tables for discrete logarithm any more. Results are also reported.
We have implemented the Jacobi symbol using basic GMP subroutines in order to have a fair comparison with our implementation of the quartic residue symbol. We note that the highly optimized GMP implementation of the Jacobi symbol mpz_jacobi provides the fastest signature generation and that the quartic residue symbol χ π is about four times slower than our implementation of the Jacobi symbol. This is mainly due to the fact that all operations are performed in Z[i] instead of Z. Due to the nature of Eisenstein integers, a similar result for cubic characters is very likely. The variants of the discrete logarithm offer a very competitive homomorphism. In particular, except for the variant using the Pollard rho method, this homomorphism is more efficient than an RSA ordinary signature. In particular, the variant with the precomputed table is three times faster than an RSA signature.
Note that these results directly apply to the confirmation protocol since the number of homomorphism evaluations the prover needs to perform is proportional (except for RSA which does not provide small signature) to that required for the signature generation.
More details about the optimization of the above homomorphisms are given in [44] .
Other Properties
We point out that our scheme allows a batch verification of signatures. Indeed, the confirmation protocol can be easily adapted in order to confirm several signatures at the same time by putting all (Xsig k , Ysig k ) in a single set S. The properties of the 2GHIproof protocol are such that the communication complexity remains the same, whereas the computation complexity is linear in the number of the signatures. To isolate a small set of m incorrect signatures in a big set of n signatures, we can use a cut-and-choose algorithm and do it with O(m log n) iterations. Note that the signer with group expertise can selectively convert an undeniable signature into a classical one by finding the coefficients a i,k ∈ Z d and r i ∈ Xgroup such that The conversion consists of revealing these coefficients. For verifying a signature, it suffices to check the above equations and verify that Ysig i = Lkey k=1 a i,k Ykey k for i = 1, . . . , Lsig. There are some cases where computing the group homomorphism does not imply group expertise but some group expertise may exist. For instance, take p ≡ q ≡ 1 (mod 4) and π ∈ Z[i] such that ππ = n. The quartic residue symbol χ π (x) can be evaluated using π and x only. It provides a single hard-to-compute bit since (χ π (x)) 2 = (x/n) is the Jacobi symbol, which is easy to compute from x and n only. Here, the value of π does not leak the factors of n so the 4-G-Root problem remains hard. We can thus obtain two levels of secrets: a first level, which is enough to compute signatures and participate to verification protocols, and another level, which can convert signatures and make NIZK proofs for public keys.
Conclusion
We have proposed a generic scheme called MOVA based on group homomorphisms which generalizes the Chaum's undeniable signature scheme. For this, we developed a general framework based on the interpolation of group homomorphisms. Several wellknown problems such as Diffie-Hellman and discrete logarithm can be easily expressed in this setting. By considering group homomorphisms with a small range group and scaling the domain group with respect to the adversary's complexity, we can naturally achieve very short signatures. As far as we know, this is the first signature scheme for which signatures of less than 80 bits can be considered. As further results, our twomove confirmation and denial protocols reach the minimal number of moves for interactive verification protocols. Possible concrete instantiations of MOVA scheme have been studied, and implementations showed that Legendre symbol offers the most efficient signature generation.
As open issues for further research, we are wondering if the interpolation of group homomorphisms can contribute to the design of other cryptographic primitives or give new theoretical insights in public-key cryptography. We also point out that designing a similar scheme (with short signatures) without using random oracles is still an open problem.
